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Abstract --Information systems security has broadened its 
meaning and significance and has started to affect our lives and 
behaviours. The research literature identifies five related 
research domains:  information systems, security policies, 
security technologies, security assurance, and security 
interfaces. This paper discusses some aspects of user 
acceptance of biometrical measurements for the purposes of 
authentication and access control and concludes that initial 
user rejection of the commonly implemented biometrics and 
fear of privacy abuse  have been replaced by a de facto user 
acceptance. It hypothesizes that there is correlation between 
users’ awareness  of the broader consequences of a particular 
biometric system and the level of their acceptance of the 
system.    
 
Index terms—Identification of Persons, Access Control,  
Privacy, Security  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
nformation systems security has broadened its meaning 
and significance and has started to affect our lives and 
behaviours. Looking at the research literature in the area, 
one notices that towards the mid 90’s of the previous 
century research in information and systems security moves 
away form the single area of trustworthy systems with 
multi-layered data protection. As shown in [1], five broader 
and more general research domains are identified:  
information systems, security policies, security 
technologies, security assurance, and security interfaces.  
  The security framework suggested by Meadows includes 
“access control” as a technique to enforce a security policy 
within a system, and “authentication” as a technique to 
protect a system against intrusion form outside. This paper 
discusses some aspects of user acceptance of biometrical 
measurements (“biometrics”) for the purposes of 
authentication and access control; the paper concludes that 
initial user rejection of the commonly implemented 
biometrics and fear of privacy abuse  have been replaced by  
a de-facto user acceptance, and hypothesises that there is 
correlation between users’ awareness  of the broader 
consequences of a particular biometric system and the level 
of their acceptance of the system.    
   T he paper is organised as follows: the next two sections 
discuss the basic objectives of information and system 
security, describe authentication as a precursor to access 
control, and introduce a framework for biometric 
authentication and access control.   The next section 
presents a literature review on  biometrics, biometric 
applications and technologies, and organizational 
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implementations with a focus on user acceptance and factors 
affecting it. The discussion and conclusion section 
summarises the current view on user acceptance of 
biometric security systems and suggests directions for 
further research.  
 
 II.  INFORMATION AND SYSTEM SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
   Most of the literature on information and systems 
security discusses issues, problems and solutions along the 
three dimensions of data integrity, information secrecy 
(confidentiality), and information availability  [2]. The 
objectives of providing integrity, secrecy and to some extent 
– availability can be met through establishing security 
access control. In turn authentication is as an approach 
towards implementing successful access control schemes 
[3].  Authentication is a process involving a series of steps 
which aims to establish the identity of the participating 
parties and deny or allow access to information resources 
controlled by these parties. The authentication process can 
be one- or   bi-directional [4] and typically relies on several 
types of authentication information [5]. Authentication 
algorithms and procedures for human participants in an 
access control scheme users can be quite versatile.  
Reference [6] identifies four methods to provide user 
authentication: i) passwords, ii) digital signature, iii) token 
devices and smart cards, and iv) biometric measurements. 
Similar classifications can be found in  [4] and in [6]. As 
these authors suggest, biometric authentication can be 
implemented independently or in conjunction with other 
authenticating methods, and can be encrypted for preserving 
the integrity of the biometrical data. On the other side, 
security devices such as digital signatures and tokens can 
incorporate biometrics either as abasic content, or in the 
form of digital signature. Such biometric security systems 
can be quite complex.  
 In [6]-[7] a biometric system is defined as an automated 
method of measuring some physical characteristic or some 
aspect of personal behaviour, and comparing the 
measurement to a pre-recorded sample for the purposes of 
verification and identification.  Most contemporary 
biometric security systems implement a multi-modal 
approach – integrating the biometric measurements of 
several individual human traits [8]. The use of several 
characteristics allows the systems to overcome some 
implementation difficulties (for example, the case of non-
homogenous population - people with no eyes and an eye 
recognition system).   
Biometrics as an approach to the achievement of a 
security objective can be dated back to ancient Egypt when 
people were identified through their physical measures [6]. 
The involvement of information technology with biometrics 
started in the early 60’s of the last century and has continued 
through cycles of success ([6]; [[9]-[10]) – or failure ([11]-
12]). A detailed description of the different biometrics used 
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in industry and in research is outside the scope of this paper, 
but most of them are introduced in the paragraphs below. 
Reference [6] identifies four types of physiological 
characteristics suitable for automated biometrics (face, 
fingerprints, hand, eye) and three types of behavioural 
characteristics (signature, voice, and keystroke dynamics). 
Later eye recognition breaks into two subtypes - the retina 
pattern and the iris image [13]. Reference [7] includes skin 
pores and wrist/hand veins as usable biometrics but points 
out that only the retina, the iris and fingerprints can be 
considered truly unique biometric identificators. Reference 
[14] extends the list behavioural and physiological 
characteristics to include some rarely used biometrics (such 
as body-signals and scull measurements), and adds a new 
type: imposed physical characteristics – such as embedded 
microchips. All biometric measurements are taken through 
various types of sensors – some general (like cameras and 
microphones), other highly specialised (see for example, the 
devices used for optical fingerprinting and for capacitative 
fingerprinting in [15].  Measurement devices are part of the 
biometric system. The next section introduces a simple 
model of a biometric system which is used as a framework 
for studying of biometric authentication for access control 
and user acceptance of biometrics. 
 
III. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS 
CONTROL 
As shown in Fig. 1, the biometric system interacts with a 
user supplied biometric (or multiple biometrics) and with a 
reference database. References [16], [1], [12] and later [17]-
[20] identify sets of requirements which a biometric system 
needs to comply with. These include performance (for 
example, speed of recognition), consistency (recognising the 
user identity in different circumstances y  - in voice 
recognition, for example), dependability (providing a unique 
identity), and acceptability (the human participant of a 
biometric systems does not object either to the method of 
collecting a biometric sample or to the way it is being used 
and protected by the system).  
The security objective of authentication in this model is to 
confirm a person’s identity – as a legitimate user of the 
systems resource (“one among many” such users) and/or 
verify a person’s identity (“one to one” match between the 
user and the database of legitimate users). These two 
authentication types are sometimes referred to as 
“identification” and “verification” ([20],[5]). More 
precisely, biometric identification is defined as process 
which allows a security system to accept or reject an 
assertion by the user that he or she has a particular identity. 
The decision to accept or reject involves a pattern 
recognition process and is based on the outcome of a search 
process across the entire database. Systems providing 
identification are refereed to as “one-to-many” or 
“recognition systems” - in contrast to “one-to-one” or 
“verification systems” where the database search aims to 
establish with a certain degree of confidence whether or not 
the user has the right to claim the identity represented by the 
biometric data. While in some cases of identification there 
might be no need for a biometric system to store a personal 
profile, verification  does require such a profile [20]-[21].    
One of the benefits of user authentication through an 
integrated biometrics-based security is the significantly 
improved control of the access to an organization’s 
information resource. Will the individual user – the subject 
of biometric identification and verification, be willing to 
accepts the potential invasion to his or her privacy as the 
organization imposes a better control on its informational 
assets?  
There is a potential conflict between the interests of the 
individual and the objectives of the organization. Based on 
prior research, [11]  compiles an impressive list of user 
“fears”; among them are the fear that a biometric system 
will help enhance the power of the organization over the 
individual. Discussing the problem of user acceptance of 
biometrically controlled access, he notes that technological 
advancement has already contributed enormously to the 
improved accuracy of identification, leading to the reduction 
of the organization’s administrative costs. He also observes 
that the public acceptance of biometric, privacy-invasive 
schemes “apparently” has increased.  According to [11],  as 
far as the use of biometrics conforms with the “standards of 
and expectations of a privacy-minded society”, individuals 
would accept albeit unwillingly the increased power of 
organizations in their use of biometrics.   
Discussing the same issue, [22] points out that it is not the 
biometric itself which is the threat to individual rights and 
privacy but rather the potential danger that unspecified third 
parties would be able to access the stored biometric data and 
use it for purposes not intended by the original security 
scheme. Applying preventive measures (such as encryption) 
to biometrical data can help create a safe environment where 
the organization and the individual share control over the 
use and the integrity of stored biometrics.  
Shared control would empower the individual and 
increase the chances of a biometric security system to 
succeed. The maxim of information technology which 
Reference [6] summarizes as  ”No matter how good the 
information technology, if people do not want it, it will not 
work”, is applicable to biometric security systems.  As 
identified in [14] , “benefits to the user” is among the three 
factors which determine the success of a biometrics scheme. 
Can the perceived benefits of a system outweigh fears of 
privacy invasion and malicious use of biometric data? In 
what circumstances will the user forgo privacy fears and 
embrace biometrics as a ” friend “ and privacy protector?  In 
the next sections we will summarize and discuss  some 
literature results form the last ten years on the use and 
acceptance of biometrics to control access to organizational 
information  resources. 
 
IV.  USER ACCEPTANCE (1992-2002) 
 
   Earlier research in the area of biometrically controlled 
access focuses on the properties of the emerging 
technologies and on specific aspects of their application 
[16], [12], [23]. User acceptance is seen mostly as a function 
of the technical variables which define a particular biometric 
system, and also of the way it is used to collect the sample 
(intrusive vs. non-intrusive).  
  
 
 
Fig.1.   Authentication and access control in a biometric security system 
 
    Sherman in [16] classifies biometrics into six types (face 
print, fingerprint, hand geometry, keystroke dynamics, 
retinal patterns, signature dynamics, voiceprint). Among the 
organizations testing biometric systems are banks (signature 
dynamics, voice recognition). Sherman predicts that 
widespread acceptability of biometrics will not become a 
fact before at least 2002, and concludes that the success of 
future biometric systems will depend on their capacity to 
satisfy reduced cost expectations of users and organizations 
alike.  
   Kim in [12] adds iris pattern recognition to the list of 
biometrics used in the security industry. Discussing user 
acceptance, he identifies two factors which influence it –the 
level of the individual’s literacy (in dynamic signature 
verification, for example), and the presence or absence of 
physical unease (in the case or retina scans). Kim concludes 
that user awareness and the provision of user   training is 
crucial for the successful implantation of biometrical 
security devices in the existing organizational culture, along 
with the implementation of adequate safeguards to protect 
personal characteristics.  
   Based on the adoption of biometrical identification by 
banks, Marshall & Steve [23] also include “customer 
acceptance” as a critical success factor to the adoption of 
biometrics by financial companies, and point out that 
customer perception of a security device as an acceptable 
one depends on its speed and usability (for example, it 
should not introduce delays at the point of sale, or should 
not deny access to a valid bank customer). Comparing 
existing biometric technologies they conclude that none of 
them overcomes the problem of user acceptance.   
   Towards the second half of the 90’s the focus of research 
on user acceptance broadens to include issues such as 
privacy and possible fraudulent or otherwise malicious use 
of stored biometric information.  For example, Monrose & 
Rubin [24] identify the advantages of permanent passive 
monitoring as a method of collecting keystroke dynamics 
samples, but warn that their methodology would be 
applicable only in environments where users have “no 
expectation of privacy”.  Another example is provided by 
Clarke in [18]; critically analyzing chip-based authentication 
schemes Clarke discusses the feasibility of a chip-card with 
a biometrical component and points out that for many 
people “biometrics are … threatening”. In his paper Clarke 
formulates two sets of system requirements, all of which are 
aimed at protecting privacy and empowering the individual. 
Specifically related to biometrics are the requirement not to 
maintain a central storage of biometrics, and the requirement 
to include a two-way authentication process in the access 
control procedure (i.e. personal chips should not simply 
respond to the signal of a security device but should verify 
the device’s authenticity). Clarke acknowledges the fact that 
implementing these and similar design requirements would 
present significant challenges to organizations but concludes 
that this would be the only way to ensure user acceptance of 
organizational security measures.  
   The importance of the first requirement is underlined by 
some examples found by Davis [9]: the existence of a 
federal centralized national database of biometric identifiers 
for commercial driver’s licenses (USA), the digital 
fingerprint databases in the states of Pennsylvania and 
Florida (USA).  Davis suggests that user acceptance will be 
ensured through the use of “one-to-one” chip-based 
matching systems that will need a centralized database. 
According to Davis the security industry itself will be the 
driving force behind the development and the adoption of 
biometrics standards for the protection of user privacy. In 
her work Davis  identifies one factor which might be 
construed as an impediment to user acceptance: user 
discrimination (an example is the case of eye biometrics and 
blind people).  
   User awareness of the possibility to use legitimately 
collected biometric data for unspecified purposes (for 
example identifying the individual’s race from an iris scan) 
as another factor which might influence user acceptance. In 
the literature of next period, the emphasis on speed and 
reliability is no longer as strong as in the early 90’s as there 
is a choice of biometric systems and an organization can 
select one that suits its requirements – including improved 
user acceptance. One example is the tutorial on automated 
  
biometrics-based identification and verification in [21]. The 
authors provide a methodology for evaluating different 
schemes and selecting the best, and the selection criteria 
variables include “user-specified system requirements”. 
   Woodard in [7] examines the specificity of privacy 
concerns implicated by biometrics. According to 
Woodward, at the heart of privacy concerns raised by the 
use of biometrical security systems lies the need of the 
individual to exercise full control in determining how, when, 
why and to whom information in the form of a biometric 
identifier should be disclosed. Based on an extensive range 
of cases and on specialized research in the areas of 
biometric technologies, Woodard identifies three different 
groups of privacy threats: i) when a unique biometric 
identifier is provide by an user, it is ‘given up”  (and the 
process cannot be reversed); ii) biometric information can 
be bough and sold by third parties without the individual’s 
knowledge or his or her consent (and there are only a few if 
any legal limits to such transactions); iii) biometric 
information obtained for authentication is in fact invasive as 
it might disclose a significant amount o details about an 
individual (for example, genetically based diseases.)  
Woodard discusses critically the advantages and 
disadvantages of biometric security systems and argues that 
in fact biometrics can and should protect information 
integrity and information privacy. He argues that the level of 
biometric security acceptance by individuals would increase 
with the increased awareness of the public at large of the 
possibilities to use biometrics as a privacy-enhancing 
technology and as a protector of the interests of the 
legitimate users of an organizational resource, but 
acknowledges the role of factors such as cultural objections 
(e.g. fingerprinting of welfare beneficiaries), possible 
religious and /or philosophical objections, and objections 
based on the actual physical harm and invasiveness.   
   Further concerns about user acceptance are raised by 
Tomko [17] and Schneier [25]: they point out that some 
biometric characteristics are not secret and can be obtained 
easily with malicious intent (eg a photograph or a 
fingerprint), or simply stolen. As a preventive measure 
Tomko [17] and also Clarke [18]-[19] suggest the use of 
trust models; according to them authenticating for eligibility 
rather than for identification and verification would be more 
acceptable to the individual.  Among the five information 
privacy principles designed by Clarke feature:  the 
requirement that an organization should justify publicly the 
purpose and use of any privacy –invasive information 
systems, and the requirement to provide the choice of 
anonymity and pseudonymity to the subject of a biometric 
security scheme.  
   Towards the end of the period reviewed in this paper the 
literature on biometric authentication for access control 
focuses again on technological advancement (see, for 
example [8] and [26]-[33]), the application of specialized 
biometric security systems [34]-[37], emerging industry 
standards ([14] as well as [38]-[40]), and on systems 
evaluation and usability issues [6], [10], [20], [41]-[42]. The 
next paragraphs summarize the results of three studies 
which explicitly qualify user acceptance of several biometric 
authentication methods. 
   In [41] Furnell et al point out that mo st biometric security 
schemes are based on a “compromise between high security 
and low user acceptance  - low security and high user 
acceptance”.  Their empirical study of user preferences 
includes eight biometrics; some of their results are shown in 
Table I (Part A), based on Fig. 2 in the referenced work.  
The first row in Part A shows the biometric method. The 
second row shows user acceptance of the method when 
implemented as a login security device, and the third row 
shows acceptance of the method when implemented through 
continuous monitoring. To be able to compare these results 
with other research findings, user responses (in percentages 
in the original work) are qualified here as ‘low’ if the 
empirical results in the source indicate positive acceptance 
below 40%, ‘very low’ for negative acceptance, and ‘high’ – 
positive acceptance above 40%.  Table I (Part B) contains a 
data from Table 2 in [20]. The evaluation of the 
acceptability of a biometric security device in this work is 
based on the study of the perceptions of three biometric 
experts.  And finally, Table I (Part C) contains data from 
Table 1 in [42]; the authors derive their findings from views 
expressed in security industry sources. The next section 
continues with a discussion of these results in the light of the 
literature review, and with a conclusion. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Biometric security technologies have shown considerable 
progress in improving their performance, and are moving 
towards standardization and interoperability:  Reference 
[40] formulates and justifies security requirements for 
biometric systems as part of a proposed biometric standard, 
bodies such the BioAPI Consortium and ANSI are working 
towards creating interoperable industry standards and 
security system evaluation protocols, and the security 
industry is booming [10], [39].  In the current climate of fear 
of terrorism some researchers like Jim Wayman, director of 
the Biometric ID Research group at San Jose State 
University of California (as cited in [35]) suggest that ‘as 
more people use biometric systems, their acceptance of the 
technology will grow, and privacy concerns subside”.  He 
supports this suggestion stating that data collected as early 
as 1990 shows a very high level (90%) of acceptance among 
people who are current users of a biometric security system 
and are aware of its benefits.  
   The data in Table I demonstrates a similar pattern; 
biometric security experts and professionals are optimistic in 
their views on user acceptance (medium to high), and end-
users (who are presumably exposed to biometric security as 
employees of the organizations targeted by the Furnell 
survey) are mostly in favour of a one-off security 
identification procedure. Still, the low or even negative level 
of acceptance of biometric monitoring procedures can be 
attributed to privacy concerns, as indicated earlier in the 
works on privacy concerns related to biometrics security.  
   The advancements of the technology and the increasing 
number of biometric security implementations have 
obviously allayed user fears related to intrusiveness, 
physical discomfort, and social status damage. A ‘rosy’ 
picture of widespread user acceptance is actively promoted 
by academics and industry professionals [43]; the interview 
with Richard Norton, executive director of IBIA – 
International Biometric Industry Association in [44]. 
Although authors such as Roger Clarke regularly voice 
concerns about the dangers of adopting biometric security 
without safeguards and checking mechanisms [45], we can 
conclude that end users in organizations are not too 
concerned with the issue.  
  
   Further research into the reasons why individuals seem to 
accept  biometric security access control might help find 
correlation between user acceptance and an identified set of 
factors. A hypothesis to test is that user awareness of 
negative consequences and privacy threats  and general 
educational background influence strongly the individual’s 
level of acceptance of a particular biometric. User type 
(customer or employee) and organization type (private or 
government) could be incorporated as moderating variables.          
 
 
Table I.  Biometric Security Acceptance Levels   
 
 Key-
stroke 
ana-lysis 
Face 
reco-
gnition 
Mouse 
dyna-
mics 
Voice 
veri--
fication 
Sign-
ature 
ana-lysis 
Iris scan-
ning 
Hand 
geo-
metry 
Finger-
print 
ana-lysis 
Retinal 
scan 
Low High Low High High High High High N/A A. Furnell 
et al Low Low Low Low Very low Very low Very low Very low N/A 
B. 
Jain et al 
N/A High N/A High High Low Medium Medium Low 
C. 
Liu & 
Silver-
man 
N/A Medium N/A High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
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